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CROLL v. CROLL AND THE 
UNFORTUNATE IRONY OF THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION: PARENTS WITH “RIGHTS 
OF ACCESS” GET NO RIGHTS TO 
ACCESS COURTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
nternational parental child abduction is a complex and se-
rious problem.1  This problem has become increasingly 
common due to the relative ease and accessibility of interna-
tional travel.2  Due to the increase in the interconnectedness 
among citizens of different countries, it is not surprising that 
there has been an increase in international family relation-
ships.3  As the number of international family relationships has 
increased, so too have the problems in the area of international 
child abductions.4  One of the main legal problems caused by 
international child abductions is that when a child has been 
taken abroad it is very difficult to enforce one’s parental rights 
in one’s home state.5  Instead, the left-behind parent must pur-
sue a remedy in the country where the child is located.6  As the 
problems with enforcing parental rights internationally became 
apparent, it became more and more critical for the international 
community to reach a satisfactory agreement on what to do 
  
 1. 2004 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, U.S. Dep’t of State (2004), available 
at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.ht 
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Report on Compliance]. 
 2. Saniya O’Brien, Note, The Trials and Tribulations of Implementing the 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Improving Dispute Reso-
lution and Enforcement of Parental Rights in the International Arena, 35 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 197 (2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. ANNE MARIE HUTCHINSON & HENRY SETRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL 
PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 3 (1998). 
 6. Id. 
I 
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about international child abductions.7  The international com-
munity needed not only to decide the best way to prevent the 
occurrence of international child abductions, but also to provide 
the courts in different countries with a method for handling the 
complex problems that arise after an international child abduc-
tion.8  Consequently, The Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction,9 which was finalized 
and adopted in 1980,10 was created due to the worldwide recog-
nition of the harmful effects on the children of parental kidnap-
ping and the desire to deter future abductions.11  While interna-
  
 7. Id. 
 8. See Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational 
Litigation for Feminists Concerned about Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 764–65 (2003) (illustrating the com-
plexity of the problems presented by international child abduction).  In her 
article, Weiner points out that:  
[T]he Hague Convention was drafted based upon the prediction that 
a noncustodial father, or a father who was unlikely to win custody, 
would typically be the abductor.…As it turns out, the drafters’ vision 
of a typical abduction has proven incorrect.  Published figures indi-
cate that seventy percent of the abductors are now mothers, typically 
the child’s primary caretaker.  Often these mothers are victims of 
domestic violence, and they are fleeing transnationally with their 
children in order to escape domestic violence. 
Id.  In light of these concerns, courts often face the troublesome possibility of 
having to send domestic violence victims to return to their abusers, which was 
certainly not the original intent of the Convention.  Therefore, some courts 
have attempted to fashion their own remedies to protect women who have fled 
to another country in order to escape domestic violence.  These remedies aim 
to protect victims of domestic violence while still returning them to the coun-
try of habitual residence for custody determinations.  For a critical view of 
these court-fashioned remedies, see Roxanne Hoegger, What If She leaves? 
Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague Convention and the Insufficiency of 
the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 183 (2003).  Hoeg-
ger argues that these remedies are “illegal, dangerous, unfair, and inefficient.”  
Id.   She also argues that “return, as applied in domestic violence cases, denies 
women’s autonomy, furthers cultural imperialism, and perpetuates class ine-
qualities.”  Id.  As a result, she argues that the Hague Convention should 
have an “explicit domestic violence defense” rather than the vague grave risk 
exception.  Id.   
 9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].      
 10. Report on Compliance, supra note 1.   
 11. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, Dec. 23, 1981, Letter of Transmittal From the White House to the Senate 
of The United States [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal].  As of February 22, 
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tional child abduction continues to be a major concern,12 many 
  
2005, the Convention was in force between the United States and fifty-five 
treaty partners.  U.S. Dep’t of State Official Website, List of Hague Conven-
tion Signatory Countries at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_ 
issues/hague_issues_1487.html (last visited, Feb. 22, 2005).  Additionally, a 
number of other countries have acceded to the Convention, but have not yet 
been accepted as partners by the United States.  U.S. Dep’t of State Official 
Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues, at http://travel.state.gov/family/ 
abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  
The State Department has provided a great deal of information to help par-
ents whose children have been abducted internationally on its website.  U.S. 
Dep’t. of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_578.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  Whereas all of the original signatories of the Con-
vention were obliged to accept all of the other original signatories, there is 
now a review process for any new country that wants to be a party to the 
treaty.  U.S. Dep’t. of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction 
Issues, at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_ 
568.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  The review process gives every original 
signatory the right to choose whether to accept the new member.  U.S. Dep’t. 
of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  The stated rationale behind the review process is 
that member states want to ensure that new members are willing to comply 
with Convention so that it will be uniformly applied.  See Report to Congress 
on International Child Abductions in Response to the Statement of Managers 
Accompanying F–103 Omnibus Appropriations Bill P.L. 108–07, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_573.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).       
 12. It is interesting to note that while international child abduction con-
tinues to be an area of major concern, neither the Hague Convention nor the 
European Convention on Recognition of Children sought to address the crimi-
nal aspects of child abduction.  HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 10.  
While both of these conventions have sought to ensure that the home state’s 
law is enforced, they have also tried to avoid having countries interpret and  
question foreign law.  Id. at 3.  Perhaps the reason that there has not been an 
agreement concerning criminal liability for international child abductions is 
that the difficulty of interpreting foreign criminal law would pose too large a 
problem.  It has also been argued that the impact of criminal prosecutions or 
threats of prosecution would not greatly benefit the abducted child.  Jacque-
line D. Golub, Note, The International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 
1993: The United States’ Attempt to Get Our Children Back—How is it Work-
ing?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 797, 812 (1999) (discussing commentary presented 
at 1990 hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary).  According to Golub:  
Many opponents to the criminalization of international parental kid-
napping feared that such a statute would actually impede the United 
States’ ability to have its children returned from the international 
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feel that the Hague Convention accomplished much of what it 
set out to do.13  The Convention’s return remedy for parents 
with rights of custody has proven to be quite successful, and “it 
has dramatically advanced both the deterrence of international 
abductions and the likelihood of having children returned.”14  
Nevertheless, while the Convention has achieved many of its 
initial goals, it still has an important flaw that has become 
more evident since it was adopted.15 
  
community.  Supporters of the Hague Convention opposed the crimi-
nalization of international parental kidnapping, citing the success of 
the Hague Convention as an encouraging end to the problem of pa-
rental abductions. 
Id. While the U.S. Congress created the International Parental Kidnapping 
Crime Act to establish international parental abduction as a criminal act, the 
Act does not include cases where a child is illegally brought into the United 
States. See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. 
§1204 (2005) [hereinafter IPKCA].  In addition, the United States has chosen 
the Hague Convention as the preferred remedy, but the IPKCA can be used 
under some circumstances, especially when children are abducted from the 
United States to countries which are not a party to the Hague Convention.  
United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 881–82 (2d Cir. 1997).  While the Hague 
Convention has been considered successful and is the preferred remedy in 
returning children who are abducted internationally, it is, nevertheless, quite 
possible that an agreement about international criminal liability for interna-
tional child abductions would help deter international child abductions.  For a 
case where the United States sought to impose criminal liability after a par-
ent was returned via a Hague proceeding see United States v. Ventre, 338 
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Ventre, the defendant tried to avoid criminal 
liability by claiming that being held criminally liable after being subject to 
Hague Convention proceedings would detract from the Hague Convention.  
Ventre, 228 F.3d at 1051–52.  However, as the court notes, “the IPKCA crimi-
nalizes the removal of a child to another country with the intent to obstruct 
parental rights.”  Id. at 1052.  As a result of this law, parents who want to 
interfere with another parent’s custody rights cannot simply choose to move to 
a country that is not a signatory to the Hague Convention.  This court also 
finds that the IPKCA demonstrates that the United States appreciates the 
seriousness of international child abduction.  Therefore, the court holds that it 
is appropriate to proceed with a criminal investigation even after one has been 
returned pursuant to the Hague Convention.  Id. at 1054.    
 13. According to the compliance report, “the Hague Abduction Convention, 
when it works, works well. But the Convention is not uniformly applied in all 
jurisdictions.”  Report on Compliance, supra note 1.   
 14. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns 
Twenty: Gender Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223 
(2000).  
 15. Id. at 222.   
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The Second Circuit’s decision in Croll v. Croll16 has received 
much scholarly attention,17 and it is a good demonstration of one 
of the Hague Convention’s main flaws.18  The Croll majority did 
not view a noncustodial parent’s rights of access,19 even when 
coupled with a ne exeat clause,20 to amount to rights of custody21 
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.22  The court held 
that a ne exeat clause can protect rights of access as well as 
rights of custody, but it does not change rights of access into 
rights of custody.23  As a result, while the court found that Mr. 
Croll had some limited remedies available to him under the 
Hague Convention, he was not entitled to a return remedy.24   
The Croll decision was quite controversial and has faced sig-
nificant criticism.25  Judge Sotomayor, in her dissent, argued 
  
 16. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 17. See generally Christopher B. Whitman, Croll v. Croll: The Second Cir-
cuit Limits “Custody Rights” Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2001) (criti-
cizing the Second Circuit’s narrow construction of the Hague Convention’s 
text).   
 18. See generally Priscilla Steward, Note, Access Rights: A Necessary Corol-
lary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 308 (1997) (arguing that 
the Hague Convention’s treatment of access rights has caused courts to mis-
construe the Convention while attempting to meet its intent).  
 19. Under the Hague Convention, rights of access are quite similar to non-
custodial visitation in the United States.  According to the Convention, “rights 
of access shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a 
place other than the child’s habitual residence.” Hague Convention, supra 
note 9, at art. 5b.         
 20. A ne exeat clause is defined as a "writ which forbids the person to 
whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the 
court." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990).  In the context of this 
case, the Hong Kong Family Court issued a ne exeat clause.  Croll, 229 F.3d at 
135.  The goal of the ne exeat clause was to ensure that Mr. Croll maintained 
his right of reasonable access.  Id.  The clause ordered the Crolls’ daughter, 
Christina, to remain in Hong Kong until she was eighteen years old unless 
she had her parents’ consent or if she was granted leave of the court.  Id. 
 21. The Hague Convention determined that “rights of custody shall include 
rights relating to the care of the person of the child, and, in particular, the 
right to determine the child’s place of residence.”  Hague Convention, supra 
note 9, at art. 5a.  
 22. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 23. Id. at 142. 
 24. Id. at 143–44. 
 25. Whitman, supra note 17, at 626–27.   
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that the ne exeat clause should have transformed Mr. Croll’s 
rights of access into rights of custody.26  Sotomayor recognizes 
that international case law has been split on whether the ne 
exeat rights amount to rights of custody.27  Nevertheless, she 
asserts that the majority ignored most other foreign courts’ in-
terpretations of the Hague Convention by interpreting rights of 
custody too narrowly.28  Judge Sotomayor believes that the 
  
 26. Croll, 229 F.3d at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Judge Sotomayor 
points out that one of the purposes of the Hague Convention was to ensure 
that the law of one Contracting State is respected in other Contracting States.  
Id.  Judge Sotomayor has a valid point that allowing a parent to take a child 
abroad “in violation of ne exeat rights granted to the other parent by an order 
from the country of habitual residence…nullifies that country’s custody law as 
effectively as does the parent who kidnaps a child in violation of the rights of 
the parent with physical custody.”  Id. at 147.  Additionally, Sotomayor points 
out that “[t]o read the Convention so narrowly as to exclude the return rem-
edy in such a situation would allow such parents to undermine the very pur-
pose of the Convention.”  Id. 
 27. Id. at 150. 
 28. Id. Judge Sotomayor points to the Family Court in Australia as an 
example of a country interpreting rights of custody broadly:   
Australia…has characterized the “spirit of the Convention” as ensur-
ing “that children who are taken from one country to another wrong-
fully, in the sense of in breach of court orders or understood legal 
rights, are promptly returned to their country so that their future can 
properly be determined within that society.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  Based on this interpretation of the Hague Convention, 
Australia recognized “rights of custody” in an otherwise noncustodial father.  
In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Res-
ina, Appeal no. 52, 1991 (Fam.) (Austl.), para. 26.  On this issue, there seems 
to be quite divergent opinions regarding the appeals court’s handling of rele-
vant foreign case law.  Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts 
Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 378–79 (2001).  For example, Reimann credits the 
Croll case for attempting to take foreign law into account when interpreting 
the Hague Convention.  Id.  However, Reimann also notes that the court may 
not have found the foreign decisions to be that helpful due to the wide variety 
of decisions in relative case law.  Id.  It seems that Reimann believes that the 
court failed to use the foreign law properly in order to reach its decision, but 
he did think that it was a step in the right direction for an American court to 
look to foreign law when interpreting a treaty.  Id. at 379.  For an English 
case where rights of custody under the Convention were construed in a more 
broad fashion, see C. v. C., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng.) : 
[The] right to give or withhold consent to any removal of the child 
from Australia, coupled with the implicit right to impose conditions, 
is a right to determine the child’s place of residence, and thus a right 
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broader interpretation is more in accordance with the purpose 
and structure of the Hague Convention.29   
In addition to Judge Sotomayor, others have criticized the 
Second Circuit for ignoring “compelling authority…with respect 
to both case law and scholarship as well as to the interpretation 
approved by the Special Commissions that review the operation 
of the Child Abduction Convention.”30  Those who believe that 
the court’s interpretation was too narrow argue that it was con-
trary to the Hague Convention’s overarching purpose.31  The 
results of this decision can be far-reaching.32  In fact, some fear 
it will lead more parents to kidnap their children because they 
would not be as likely to be returned by a friendly forum.33  
Even among those who support the substantive outcome of the 
Croll decision, some have criticized the court for what they per-
ceive to be a lack of deference to the existing international in-
terpretations of the Hague Convention.34   
  
of custody within the meaning of arts 3 and 5 of the convention…this 
conclusion is in accordance with the objects of the convention. 
Id.   
 29. Croll, 229 F.3d at 150. 
 30. Silberman, supra note 14, at 228–29. 
 31. See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, 3 Acts and Documents of the 14th Session 426, 447 (1980).  
Pérez-Vera, whose report is the official history and commentary of the Con-
vention, indicates that the Convention’s intention was to protect all of the 
ways that parents exercise child custody.  Id.  While some scholars choose to 
argue that the recognition of all types of child custody shows intent upon the 
framers of the Convention to include those with rights of access, it is clear 
based on the definitions provided by the Convention that the distinction was 
intended.  Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 5.  However, given the fact 
that Pérez-Vera also indicates that a child’s country is best suited to make 
custody and access determinations, it is quite puzzling that the Convention 
chose to make the distinction.     
 32. Deborah M. Huynh, Note, Croll v. Croll: Can Rights of Access Ever 
Merit a Remedy of Return Under the Hague Abduction Convention?, 26 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 529, 557 (2001). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and 
Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
275, 281 (2002).   
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While the Croll decision has received much valid criticism, 
much of it is misdirected.35  In Croll, the majority accurately 
interpreted and correctly applied the Hague Convention.36  The 
decision, however, points out an inherent flaw in the Hague 
Convention, namely that the Convention does not place enough 
value on a noncustodial parent’s rights of access—especially 
those who have agreements which contain a ne exeat clause.37  
As a result, the drafters, unfortunately, did not give the judicial 
or administrative authorities enough power to help enforce the 
laws of the child’s habitual residence.38  Therefore, it is neces-
sary to create an amendment to the Convention which will 
grant noncustodial parents a remedy of return in situations 
where the custodial parent has violated the noncustodial par-
ent’s rights of access by removing the child from the child’s ha-
bitual residence,39 despite the existence of an order with a ne 
  
 35. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589.  (“The right of access is, 
of course, important, but, as we have seen, it was not intended to be given the 
same level of protection by the Convention as custody.”).   
 36. Weiner, supra note 34, at 308.  Weiner maintains that: 
Croll reaches the right substantive result: a ne exeat clause does not 
convert rights of access into rights of custody.  Yet, Croll is still a 
failure of American Hague Convention jurisprudence.  Although I be-
lieve the substantive result was right, the opinion rests on, and em-
phasizes the Convention’s wording and the drafter’s intent, and pays 
only minimal lip service to the purpose and design of the Convention 
and case law from sister signatories. 
Id. 
 37. Of course, some foreign courts have found that a ne exeat clause does 
give a father veto power over a mother’s ability to move, and it confers on him 
rights of custody.  C. v. C., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng.) (Judgment of L.J. Neill).  
However, even though some could argue that some foreign courts (even a ma-
jority) have come to a different conclusion than Croll, this still does not indi-
cate that the Croll decision was wrong.  After all, the main problem is the 
interpretation of rights of custody, which may very well be different in differ-
ent countries.  In fact, the discrepancy provides even more support for the 
notion that the Convention should have defined its terms to provide a better 
way for determining what constitutes rights of custody.  
 38. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.  (“Because courts in the United States have 
jurisdiction to enforce the Convention by ordering a child’s return to her ha-
bitual residence only if the child has been removed in breach of a petitioning 
parent’s custodial rights, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order return 
in this case.”).  
 39. The Convention did not define the meaning of a child’s habitual resi-
dence, so it has been left up to the courts of the Contracting States to deter-
mine what makes a country a child’s habitual residence.  Pérez-Vera, supra 
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exeat clause issued by a valid judicial body located in the child’s 
habitual residence.40   
In Part II, this Note will describe the elements of the Hague 
Convention as it is presently constituted and its available 
remedies and exceptions.  In Part III, this Note will examine 
the Croll decision and will demonstrate that the court accu-
rately recognized the distinction between rights of custody and 
rights of access under the current Hague Convention.  Part III 
will also argue that while the Croll decision is technically cor-
rect, it illustrates a weakness in the Convention.  In Part IV, 
this Note will illustrate this weakness and suggest a solution by 
exploring the different ways in which courts in the United 
States have enforced court-ordered visitation, which demon-
strate the high value placed on visitation by noncustodial par-
ents.  Part V will discuss how courts in foreign jurisdictions 
have interpreted situations similar to the Croll case and argue 
that these contrasting decisions further reveal an inherent 
problem with the Convention.   It will suggest that the Hague 
  
note 31, at 441 (“The convention, following a long-established tradition of the 
Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it.”).  Therefore, 
“many of the significant terms used by the Child Abduction Convention – ha-
bitual residence, custody rights, grave risk of harm – are inherently ambigu-
ous and subject to varying interpretations.”  Silberman, supra note 14, at 246.  
While different States may have different ways of determining the habitual 
residence of a child, it is generally determined with regard to the physical 
location of the child and the settled intention as to the residence of the custo-
dial parent.  HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 6.  Nevertheless, ha-
bitual residence is a crucial question of fact that can determine whether a case 
can be brought under the Hague Convention.  Id. 
 40. However, it is also worth noting that the ne exeat clause need not be 
the be all and end all.  After all, since the best interests of a child are gener-
ally presumed to be better served by contact with both the custodial and non-
custodial parents, there is no reason to limit the remedy of return to noncus-
todial parents.  A remedy of return does not necessarily mean that the non-
custodial parent will get custody of the child, and it does not mean that the 
custodial parent will not be allowed to move.  Instead, such a remedy would 
merely ensure that the child’s home state would have the opportunity to make 
the decision.  As Weiner points out, “[n]owhere does the Convention suggest 
that the remedy of return delivers the child to a custodial parent.  In fact, the 
Convention has no position on this issue, other than that the children are to 
be returned typically to the habitual residence.”  Weiner, supra note 34, at 
320. Thus, a return remedy would likely lessen the incentive to move without 
the consent of the noncustodial parent and the court’s permission.   
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Convention would similarly benefit from placing a high value on 
a noncustodial parent’s rights of access, that the Convention 
should be amended to include some of the same remedies that 
U.S. courts have made available to noncustodial parents.  Fi-
nally, this Note will suggest that granting a return remedy to 
parents with rights of access will help rectify the problems cre-
ated by the Convention to better meet the Convention’s stated 
objectives.   While the return remedy will not always prevent a 
person with custody from moving with his or her child, it will 
make it more likely that the proper protocol will be followed.  In 
addition, it will provide the left-behind parent with an adequate 
remedy for situations when the proper protocol is not followed. 
II. THE HAGUE: ELEMENTS AND EXCEPTIONS 
A. The Purpose of the Hague Convention 
The express purpose of the Hague Convention (Convention) is 
to protect the interests of children in custody matters by provid-
ing a method “to secure the prompt return of children wrong-
fully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and to 
ensure that the rights of custody and of access under the law of 
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other 
Contracting States.”41  The Convention considers removal or 
retention to be wrongful when a parent removes a child from 
his or her habitual residence in violation of the other parent’s 
rights of custody.42     
  
 41. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 1.  The Hague Convention was 
created to “apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting 
State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.  The Conven-
tion shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”  Id. at 
art. 4.   
 42. Id. at art. 3.  Article three states: 
It is a breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institu-
tion, or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the 
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before 
the removal or retention; and at the time of the removal or retention 
those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would 
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.   
Id. 
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B. The Procedure Set Forth by the Hague Convention 
When a child abduction has occurred, the Convention affords 
the opportunity for a “requesting” Contracting State to make an 
application on behalf of the person seeking return of a child 
from another “requested” Contracting State.43  Each Contracting 
State has established a central authority under the Convention 
for the purpose of processing such applications, although the 
way the central authorities have been set up differs in different 
States.44  In the United States, a petitioner may file a petition 
with a state trial court or Federal District Court.45  Different 
states follow different rules and procedures, and there will also 
be differences in the rules and procedures between state and 
federal Court.46  After the filing of the petition, the Central Au-
thority supports the petitioner by aiding the petitioner’s attor-
ney.47  In addition, the Central Authority sends a letter written 
by the State Department to the judge who will preside over the 
hearing which informs the judge about the Convention and ex-
plains its impact.48  Generally, the procedures established by 
the Convention have been successful at returning children who 
have been wrongfully removed from their home state, especially 
when compared with countries that are not parties to the Con-
vention.49     
C. Exceptions to the Remedy of Return 
The Convention fashioned six narrow exceptions to the return 
remedy even in cases where it was proven that a child had been 
  
 43. HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 210. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See GEOFFREY L. GREIF & REBECCA HEGAR, WHEN PARENTS KIDNAP: THE 
FAMILIES BEHIND THE HEADLINES 194–95 (1993).  Greif and Hegar found that 
eighty-four percent of the abductions to Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia resulted in recovery, whereas only forty-three percent of interna-
tional abductions to non-Hague destinations led to recovery.  Id.  While there 
are a number of other factors that may affect this difference in the rates of 
recovery of abducted children, the Convention can certainly account for some 
of those results.      
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“wrongfully” removed or retained in a foreign country.50  Many 
courts have been inclined to construe these exceptions narrowly 
and thereby order the return of the child even when an excep-
tion has been established.  These courts recognize that courts in 
the “abducted-from country” are still equally or better suited to 
determine the proper outcome of cases.51  Therefore, the courts 
see little harm in returning a child to the courts of his or her 
habitual residence for dispute resolution.52  In fact, the Conven-
  
 50. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357–58 
(M.D.Fla. 2002). These exceptions, which were created to protect the best 
interests of the child, are as follows:  
A court is not bound to order the return of a child if respondent dem-
onstrates by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) the person having 
care of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the 
time of removal or retention … or (2) the person having care of the 
child had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or 
retention of the child … or (3) “the child objects to being returned and 
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate 
to take account of its views.” … or (4) the proceedings were com-
menced more than one year after the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention and “the child is now settled in its new environment.” …  
Additionally, a court is not bound to order the return of a child if re-
spondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that: (5) 
there is a grave risk that the child’s return would “expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an in-
tolerable situation.” … or (6) return of the child would not be permit-
ted by fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. [However], 
[e]ven if an exception is established, the Court has discretion to order 
the return of a child if return would further the aims of the Hague 
Convention.   
Id.  Note that inconsistent interpretations of article 13 are possible under the 
Convention because: 
The Child Abduction Convention does not define what constitutes a 
grave risk of physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situa-
tion, nor at what age a child may decide for him or herself not to re-
turn, but rather depends upon the judge to make the determination 
within the object and purpose of the Child Abduction Convention as a 
whole. 
Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the United 
States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 285, 325 (2000).  
 51. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996).   
 52. For an explanation of the rationale behind the exceptions to the return 
remedy, see Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 432.  
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tion was not intended to settle disputes about legal custody 
rights.53  Instead, the Convention was intended to “restore the 
factual situation that existed prior to a child’s removal or reten-
tion”54 so as to ensure that an “international abductor [was] de-
nied legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in the 
country where the child is located.”55  Unfortunately, the Con-
vention did not go far enough to ensure that international ab-
ductors would be denied legal advantage from their abduc-
tions.56  As the Croll case reveals, one can still escape the decree 
of a child’s habitual residence by absconding from the country 
as long as the parent they are leaving does not have rights of 
custody.57   
III.  CROLL V. CROLL: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS    
A. The Facts of Croll 
In Croll, Stephen Croll filed a petition to force his wife, Mei 
Yee Croll, to return their child to Hong Kong under the Hague 
Convention.58  Mr. and Mrs. Croll, who are both U.S. citizens, 
got married in Hong Kong in 1982.59  Eight years later, Mrs. 
Croll gave birth to their child, Christina, in Hong Kong, and 
they lived there together for another eight years.60  In 1998, Mr. 
and Mrs. Croll separated.61  Christina lived with her mother, 
but she continued to see her father regularly.62  That same year, 
Mr. Croll brought divorce proceedings in the District Court of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Matrimonial 
Causes, and Mrs. Croll was granted “sole ‘custody, care and 
control’ of Christina.”63  Mr. Croll, however, was to continue to 
  
 53. Letter of Transmittal, supra, note 11, at 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. It is evident that the failure to provide a remedy for parents with 
rights of access can have deleterious effects on a child regardless of whether a 
child was removed from a parent with rights of custody or rights of access.  
See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 428–29. 
 57. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.   
 58. Id. at 134. 
 59. Id. at 135.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
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have a right of ‘reasonable access.’64  In order to ensure that 
there was no misunderstanding as to the meaning of the cus-
tody decree, the Hong Kong court inserted a ne exeat clause, 
which stated that Christina could not leave Hong Kong until 
she reached the age of eighteen65 without leave of the court or 
consent by both parents.66   
On April 2, 1999, while Mr. Croll was away on a business 
trip, Mrs. Croll and Christina traveled to New York City with-
out leave of the court or Mr. Croll’s consent.67  Upon Mr. Croll’s 
return, he was informed that his wife and child had gone to the 
United States.68  When they had not returned more than a 
month later, Mr. Croll filed a Hague petition in the Southern 
District of New York in order to compel Christina’s return.69   
When the case was brought in the District Court, both sides 
agreed that Christina was a habitual resident in Hong Kong 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.70   
Mrs. Croll also did not claim that her right to remove Christina 
was based on one of the exceptions to the Convention’s return 
remedy.71  Apparently, Mrs. Croll did not believe there was suf-
  
 64. Id. 
 65. While the ne exeat clause provided that Christina could not leave until 
she was eighteen years old, unless she had permission from her father or the 
court, the Hague Convention only provides a return remedy for children under 
sixteen years of age.  Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 4.  Since Chris-
tina was only about eight years old at the time of the divorce, the Convention 
obviously still applied to her.  Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.  However, in jurisdic-
tions where the courts decide to honor ne exeat clauses coupled with rights of 
access, it will be interesting to see whether courts would also choose to honor 
ne exeat clauses such as the one in Croll, which prohibits the noncustodial 
parent from taking a child out of the country until she is over eighteen, or if 
courts will limit the return remedy to children sixteen and under as provided 
in the Convention.  Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 4.  Since it is 
much less common for a child near the age of majority to be kidnapped, this 
may be a moot point.  Either way, it is doubtful that a court would extend the 
return remedy beyond the age of sixteen—even if there was a violation of a ne 
exeat clause.  Furthermore, since the Hague provides older children with the 
opportunity to voice their opinions in order to avoid return, the problem might 
be solved by asking the children’s preference in such a case.      
 66. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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ficient evidence to prove that Mr. Croll had failed to exercise his 
custody rights or that he had consented to her leaving.72  In ad-
dition, Mrs. Croll did not attempt to show that there would be a 
grave risk to Christina73 if she were forced to return to Hong 
Kong.74  Instead, Mrs. Croll argued that Mr. Croll did not have 
rights of custody over Christina and that he merely had rights 
of access, thus, he was not entitled to relief in the Federal Dis-
trict Courts because the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
  
 72. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 73. See Weiner, supra note 34, at nn.214–17.  In reality, at the trial court 
level, Mrs. Croll attempted to enter evidence of domestic violence against her-
self and Christina.  Id.  Mrs. Croll alleged that she had previously attempted 
to get an order of protection against her husband, and that she filed a com-
plaint with the police alleging assault. Id. at n.214.  Mrs. Croll also testified to 
other instances of violence, including a fight that she alleged occurred in front 
of Christina.  Id.  In addition, Mrs. Croll alleged that Christina had been 
physically abused.  Id.  Nevertheless, the court never came to a factual deter-
mination as to whether Mr. Croll was a batterer, likely due in part to the fact 
that the charges Mrs. Croll had brought were dismissed based on lack of evi-
dence.  Id. at n.216.  Instead, the court ruled that Christina did not witness 
any of the alleged abuse, so the evidence was not relevant to the Hague peti-
tion.  Id.  While the trial court did not seem to find the allegations of abuse 
relevant, it is possible the allegations had an impact on the Second Circuit’s 
decision.  It is possible that since there is a difficult burden in establishing a 
grave risk, the court may have found it easier to deny jurisdiction rather than 
try to grant a grave risk exception to the return remedy.       
 74. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 13.  The Hague Convention 
provides that: 
[T]he judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is 
not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution, or 
other body which opposes its return established that a person, insti-
tution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not 
actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or reten-
tion, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal 
or retention or there is a grave risk that his or her return would ex-
pose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.  The judicial or administrative 
authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds 
that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and 
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
views…the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into ac-
count the information relating to the social background of the child 
provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the 
child’s habitual residence. 
Id. 
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tion.75  The District Court, however, accepted Mr. Croll’s argu-
ment that the ne exeat clause provided by the Hong Kong Court 
gave him the right to determine his child’s place of residence.76  
The court then found that Mr. Croll’s right to determine Chris-
tina’s place of residence was equivalent to rights of custody 
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.77  Since Chris-
tina’s removal from Hong Kong was deemed to be in violation of 
her father’s rights of custody, her removal was found to be 
wrongful within the meaning of the Convention.78  
On appeal, the case was reviewed de novo in order to deter-
mine whether Mr. Croll had rights of custody or rights of access 
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.79  The method for 
interpreting treaties is similar to the method for interpreting 
statutes.80  Since the issue of whether rights of access joined 
with a ne exeat clause amounts to rights of custody under the 
Hague Convention had never arisen before the Croll case, this 
was a case of first impression.81  The Second Circuit distin-
  
 75. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 76. Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Croll, 229 F.3d at 136. 
 80. Id.  Here, the court explains that it must first look to the ordinary 
meaning of the Convention.  Id.  If the ordinary meaning is ambiguous, the 
court “may resort to extraneous tools of interpretations such as a treaty’s rati-
fication history and subsequent operation.”  Id. 
 81. Id.  While this was a case of first impression, other federal courts have 
subsequently addressed this issue.  Fourth and Ninth Circuits both followed 
Croll’s reasoning.  See generally Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 
2003) (reversing district court’s holding that Scottish law giving mother a 
right to determine a child’s residence created a right of custody under the 
Convention); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
ne exeat clause combined with visitation did not amount to right of custody 
under the Convention).  For a critical view of the Hague Convention and the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, see Sara J. Bass, 
Note, Ne Exeat Clauses Proven Ineffective: How the Hague Convention Renders 
Access Rights Illusory, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 573 (2004).  Conversely, 
the Eleventh Circuit chose not to accept Croll’s interpretation of rights of ac-
cess.  Instead, it found that a Norwegian father’s statutory ne exeat right cou-
pled with a right of access amounted to a right of custody under Norwegian 
law.  See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 715 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Given that the 
goal of the Hague Convention is to deter international abduction, we readily 
interpret the ne exeat right as including the right to determine the child’s 
place of residence because the ne exeat right provides a parent with decision-
making authority regarding the child’s international relocation.”). The court 
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recognized that the parents in Norway had joint parental responsibility; 
therefore, while Ms. Reeves could decide where in Norway the child could live, 
she had to remain in Norway or get consent to move.  Id. at 709.  Since Ms. 
Reeves did not ask permission to move beyond Norway, the court found the 
removal to be wrongful under the Hague Convention, and it issued a return 
order  Id. at 710.  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that: 
In American courts, we tend to think of custody rights primarily in 
the sense of physical custody of the child.  However, in applying the 
Hague Convention, we must look to the definition of “rights of cus-
tody” set forth in the Convention and not allow our somewhat differ-
ent American concepts of custody to cloud our application of the Con-
vention’s terms.  Specifically, in this case we must think of “rights of 
custody” as including “rights relating to the care of the person of the 
child,” and in particular, “the right to determine the child’s place of 
residence.” 
Id. at 711.  Interestingly, while the legal arguments put forth by the plaintiff, 
Furnes, are similar to the arguments made in Croll and Gutierrez, the factual 
backgrounds of the cases are quite different.  In Furnes, the petitioner was 
more sympathetic, and the defendant much less so.  Furnes, 362 F.3d at 704 
(“Plaintiff Furnes and Defendant Reeve’s relationship was marked by con-
stant conflict.  Defendant Reeves…commonly thwarted Plaintiff Furnes’s at-
tempts to exercise his visitation rights.  Defendant Reeves also made serious 
allegations against Plaintiff Furnes…which were…groundless….In con-
trast,…Furnes was an understanding and cooperative parent and was able to 
offer Jessica a secure home.”).  Id. at 704–05.  While the Eleventh Circuit does 
construct valid arguments when interpreting Norwegian law, and these ar-
guments are similar to those in Sotomayor’s passionate dissent in Croll, one 
can still wonder if the courts in Croll, Gutierrez, and Furnes allowed the char-
acter traits of the litigants to affect their respective decisions.  Clearly, this 
would be the type of decision-making that the Convention tried to avoid.  
Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 430 (“The Convention rests implicitly upon the 
principle that any debate on the merits of the question, i.e. of custody rights, 
should take place before the competent authorities in the State where the 
child had its habitual residence prior to its removal.”).  Id.  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision addresses this concern by pointing out that they did not reach 
the merits of the custody case, but rather it simply ordered that it be ad-
dressed in the child’s habitual residence prior to the abduction.   Furnes, 362 
F.3d at 721. The court also criticized the Croll decision:  
Accordingly, our construction of the ne exeat right does not alter the 
terms of the custody agreement.  Rather, it simply would inconven-
ience Mrs. Croll as the custodial parent by requiring that she comply 
with its terms.  The Convention’s purpose is to prevent the interna-
tional abduction of children and is thwarted, not satisfied, by the 
Croll majority’s construction of the ne exeat right. 
Id. While it is true that the main purpose of the convention is thwarted by 
Croll’s interpretation, the Convention’s failure to adequately define rights of 
access and rights of custody will continue to force courts to make their own 
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guished rights of access from rights of custody and held that 
Mr. Croll’s ne exeat clause did not elevate his rights of access to 
rights of custody.82  As a result, the court denied having juris-
diction under the Convention and reversed the order to return 
Christina to Hong Kong.83   
In finding that Mr. Croll merely had rights of access, the 
court rejected Mr. Croll’s argument that since “a ne exeat clause 
gives an otherwise noncustodial parent a power that amounts to 
‘a right to determine the child’s place of residence’ [and that 
this clause] thereby creates a ‘right of custody’ that is protected 
by the Convention’s return remedy.”84  While Mr. Croll was not 
granted the return remedy that he desired, the court argued 
that he was not without a remedy.85  On the contrary, pursuant 
to one of the remedies under the Convention, the court sug-
gested that Mr. Croll could obtain a “writ ordering the custodial 
parent who has removed the child from the habitual residence 
to permit, and to pay for, periodic visitation by the noncustodial 
parent with access rights.”86  However, due to the great distance 
between Hong Kong and New York City, it is unlikely that this 
remedy will provide Mr. Croll with nearly the same amount of 
visitation as he enjoyed pursuant to the Hong Kong divorce 
agreement.87  Therefore, this alternative is not only unrealistic, 
but unreasonable. 
  
individual interpretations of foreign law until an amendment is created or a 
common definition becomes accepted.   
 82. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 83. Id. at 135–36. 
 84. Id. at 139.   
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 138. 
 87. Eric S. Horstmeyer, Note, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their 
Impact on its Efficacy, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 125, 127 (1994). Horstmeyer 
recognizes the Convention’s flaw when it comes to enforcing a noncustodial 
parents’ visitation rights.  Id. at 127. (“The Court was unable to fashion a 
remedy for the noncustodial parent because of his indigent status and his 
inability to fund his legal visitation in a foreign country.  This decision illus-
trates the Convention’s glaring weakness in terms of its ability to protect 
rights of access adequately.”).  While Horstmeyer has a strong argument that 
the courts have failed to interpret the Convention carefully enough to make it 
effective, this problem is further elucidated in Croll, due to the fact that the 
child was taken in violation of a ne exeat clause.  Therefore, even if one were 
to argue that the father in Viragh v. Foldes, should not be entitled to a return 
 
File: Dan MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on: 3/30/2005 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:17 PM 
2005] INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 659 
B. Analysis of Court’s Interpretation of Custody Rights versus 
Access Rights 
The Second Circuit correctly distinguished rights of custody 
from rights of access in accordance with Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention.88  Custody rights are those “rights relating to the 
care of the person of the child, and, in particular, the right to 
determine the child’s place of residence.”89  Rights of access, 
however, are defined as “the right to take a child for a limited 
period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual resi-
dence.”90  This distinction is quite important since the Conven-
tion only deems a removal to be wrongful where one has vio-
lated custody rights.91  Therefore, a parent with mere access 
rights cannot seek the return of the child for violation of these 
rights.92  Instead, a parent with access rights may attempt to 
prevent the breach of access rights by applying to the Central 
Authority of a Contracting State.93  The treaty, however, is si-
lent regarding remedies for noncustodial parents whose rights 
of access have been obstructed.94  Given the fact that “unlawful 
  
remedy because he did not have rights of custody, the ne exeat clause coupled 
with rights of custody surely should be enough to warrant a return remedy.  
Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993). 
 88. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 5.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Silberman, supra note 14, at 225. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6. 
 94. Viragh, 612 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Mass. 1993).  Viragh acknowledges that:  
[N]ations are instructed in art. 21 to “promote the peaceful enjoyment 
of access rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the ex-
ercise of those rights may be subject,” as well as to “take steps to re-
move, as far as possible all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.”   
Id.  In this case, the court found that even though the “children’s presence in 
the United States makes practically impossible the exercise of the precise 
visitation schedule ordered by the Guardianship Authority [t]hat, however, 
does not mean that [the noncustodial parent] is prevented from effectively 
exercising his access rights to the children in the United States.”  Id. at n.9.  
This finding, however, should be questioned for it shows a lack of respect for 
the Guardianship authority in Budapest, and it seems as though it is letting 
the United States substitute its own decision for the decision in the habitual 
residence of the child.  Whereas the Budapest Guardianship Authority deter-
mined that it would be in the best interests of the children for Mr. Gabor to 
have visitation on “alternate weekends, two weeks each in July and August, 
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unilateral removals – as well as real abductions – are harmful 
to children, whether the parent who removes is a mother or a 
father,”95 there is no valid reason for the Hague Convention to 
distinguish between rights of access and rights of custody.96 
  
and three days during the children’s winter and spring holiday,” the U.S. 
court decided that other arrangements could be equally in the best interests of 
the child.  Id.  In Viragh, there was not a ne exeat clause.  However, Hungar-
ian law requires custodial parents to get permission from the noncustodial 
parent or the court before permanently removing a child from Hungary.  Id. at 
246.  Clearly, such a law would have the same effect as a ne exeat clause.  
Nevertheless, since the court recognized that the Convention was silent with 
regard to rights of access, and since the court probably did not want to be 
involved in interpreting Hungarian law, the court did not grant the return 
remedy.  Horstmeyer, supra note 87, at 138.  It should also be noted that Mrs. 
Foldes had good reason for leaving Hungary without notifying Mr. Viragh, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had some good reasons for 
wanting to deny a return remedy:   
Gabor had not been a model husband.  He physically abused and ver-
bally threatened Maria [Mrs. Foldes] on a number of occasions both 
prior to and following the divorce, one time attacking her when she 
was seven months pregnant with their second child.  At the time 
Maria requested the divorce, Gabor was so distressed that he threat-
ened to kill himself and the two children and also told Maria that, if 
she continued with her divorce action, she would never see the chil-
dren again….She also believed….that Gabor would file a new law suit 
or petition for custody thus forcing her to remain in Hungary to ap-
pear and answer new allegations.  It was Maria’s understanding that 
she would not be permitted to fly overseas during the last three 
months of pregnancy, and therefore any potential litigation in Hun-
gary would result in her separation from Mihaly [her new husband] 
until after the birth of her child. 
Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 244.  While there is certainly a compelling argument 
that Mrs. Foldes should not have been returned to Hungary, it would still 
show more respect for international law to have denied the return remedy 
based on the grave risk exception to the Convention.  Hague Convention, su-
pra note 9, at art. 13b.  Unfortunately, since the burden of proving a grave 
risk is so difficult, and since the Convention does not give a return remedy 
unless the left-behind parent has a right of access, the court did not choose to 
follow this route.  Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 243.   
 95. Silberman, supra note 14, at 225 (citations omitted). 
 96. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31 at 432.  Pérez-Vera noted that: 
[I]n the literature devoted to a study of this problem, ‘the presump-
tion generally stated is that the true victim of the ‘childnapping’ is 
the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stabil-
ity, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in 
charge of his upbrining, the uncertainty and frustration which come 
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Similarly, since the Convention’s goal was “to restore the fac-
tual situation that existed prior to a child’s removal or reten-
tion,”97 the Convention should allow the courts to do just that.   
The court in Croll, however, was limited by the Convention’s 
distinction between rights of custody and rights of access so it 
did not have the jurisdictional authority to issue a return rem-
edy.98  Since the Hong Kong courts had implemented the ne 
exeat clause into the Croll’s divorce, when Mrs. Croll wanted to 
alter the divorce agreement, she should have attempted to have 
it altered in Hong Kong.  As the dissenting judge in Croll 
pointed out, because Mrs. Croll was required to remain in Hong 
Kong, this “impliedly gave the [Hong Kong] court and the par-
ent without physical custody the right to veto an international 
move, [and] it vested both with the power to determine the 
child’s residence.”99  However, due to the distinction between 
rights of access and rights of custody under the Convention, the 
court was powerless to issue a return remedy, which would 
have been the proper solution under the circumstances.  
C. Remedies Granted to Parents with Rights of Access 
Under the Hague Convention, a parent who merely has rights 
of access cannot file a petition claiming that there was a wrong-
ful removal.100  If there is no allegation or evidence of wrongful 
removal or retention outside the country of habitual residence, 
then the District Courts do not have “independent authority to 
  
with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural 
conditions and unknown teachers and relatives.’ 
Id.   
 97. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at preamble. 
 98. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 445.  Pérez-Vera explains:  
Although the problems which can arise from a breach of access rights, 
especially where the child is taken abroad by its custodian, were 
raised during the Fourteenth Session, the majority view was that 
such situations could not be put in the same category as the wrongful 
removals which it is sought to prevent.   
Id.  Here, it is evident that the drafters of the Convention considered eliminat-
ing any distinction between rights of custody and rights of access, but chose 
not to do so.  Therefore, while the court in Croll correctly interpreted the Con-
vention, this illustrates the drafter’s misconception of what is in the best in-
terests of the child.       
 99. Croll, 229 F.3d at 151. 
 100. Id. at 135. 
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remedy the situation.”101  However, this is not supposed to leave 
the left-behind parent completely without recourse.102  Instead, 
the left-behind parent may file a claim for visitation rights in 
state court under the state’s visitation statute.103  The Conven-
tion also allows the petitioner to file a petition with the Central 
Authority to aid in his or her request for the enforcement of 
visitation.104  Unfortunately, however, the remedies presented to 
a noncustodial parent are insufficient;105 they do not adequately 
serve the interests of justice, they may not be in the best inter-
  
 101. Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  As the 
court notes in Terron v. Ruff, No. 48683-7-1, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 456, at 
*7 (Wash. 2003), “In 1988, the United States Congress adopted the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. § 11601, in order to 
implement the Convention.  ICARA establishes specific burdens of proof for 
the parent seeking the return of the child under the Convention and for par-
ents opposed to the child’s return.”  Id.  The standard of evidence to prove 
wrongful removal of a child is the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Id.    
 102. Terron, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 456, at n.4 (“A separate provision, 
Article 21, provides that a party may apply to secure the ‘effective exercise of 
rights of access.’  In addition, the Convention imposes an obligation on Central 
Authorities to ‘make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective 
exercise of rights of access.’”). 
 103. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 862.  The court in Bromley expressed one 
rationale for refusing jurisdiction in the federal courts:  
The arena of child custody matters, except for the limited matters of 
international abduction expressly addressed by the Convention, 
would be better handled by the state courts which are more numer-
ous and have both the experience and resources to deal with this spe-
cial area of the law.  There is a growing trend towards establishing 
specialized state family courts, which avoid a piecemeal approach to 
domestic relations problems.   
Id.  Unfortunately, however, this remedy is unlikely to be satisfactory due to 
the lack of power to issue a return remedy.  While the left-behind parent can 
file for visitation, it may be very difficult for the visitation actually to occur.  
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, this may be a suitable outcome.   
 104. See Janzik v. Schand, No. 99 C 6515, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17154 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2000).  
 105. Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: 
A Brief Analysis and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAMILY L.Q. 9, 11 (1994). (“The 
Convention does not offer uniform international standards for determining 
custody rights.”).  This failure makes it difficult for courts to determine 
whether a return remedy should be granted and forces the requested State to 
determine whether there were rights of custody under the requested State’s 
law when it is supposed to be enforcing determinations in the requesting 
State.   
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ests of the child, and they do not serve the purpose of the 
treaty.106 
IV. DOMESTIC POLICY REGARDING VISITATION AND RELOCATION 
A. Presumption in Favor of Noncustodial Visitation  
In order to propose a solution to the problem presented by the 
Croll case, this Note will examine how courts in the United 
States address similar issues.  In general, U.S. domestic policy 
supports the idea that it would be unfair and contrary to the 
best interests of the child to prevent a noncustodial parent from 
visitation “absent exceptional or compelling circumstances.”107  
This is due to the recognition that a child is likely to be harmed 
by a custodial parent’s choice to separate the child from a par-
ent who has been granted rights of access.108  The rationale is 
that “visitation is a right jointly enjoyed by the noncustodial 
parent and the child and that interest is served best when ‘nur-
  
 106. See GREIF & HEGAR, supra note 49, at 183–87.  
 107. Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 920, 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).  In 
Pecorello, the court states that “absent exceptional or compelling circum-
stances, a geographic relocation by a custodial parent which will effectively 
deny a noncustodial parent visitation will not be permitted.”  Id. at 920–21.  
In the Pecorello case, however, the court found that the custodial parent’s 
remarriage of a divorced parent was an exceptional circumstance and allowed 
her to relocate. Id.  Unlike in Pecorello, in the Croll case, however, Mrs. Croll 
did not remarry and would be unable to demonstrate such an exceptional cir-
cumstance.  Similarly, the Hague Convention has a system in place to prevent 
against returning an abducted child to a noncustodial parent:  
Nothwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the judicial 
or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to or-
der the return of the child if the person, institution, or other body 
which opposes its return establishes that…b there is a grave risk that 
his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 
25, 1980, art 13b, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. In addition, the Hague Convention “may 
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appro-
priate to take account of its views.”  Id.  Therefore, there is no harm in extend-
ing the remedy of return based on rights of access barring such exceptional 
circumstances that are protected against in article 13b, but there is a harm in 
setting the dangerous precedent that will allow a custodial parent to move 
away from a noncustodial parent on a personal whim.   
 108. See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 428. 
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tured by regular, frequent and welcomed visitation.’”109  Because 
of the value that courts place on a noncustodial parent’s rights 
to visitation, there is a “heavy burden of proving exceptional 
circumstances or pressing concerns for the welfare of the custo-
dial parent or the child which would warrant relocation.”110   
B. Best Interests of the Child 
Due to the presumption that contact with both parents is in 
the best interests of a child, if Mrs. Croll had been divorced in 
the United States, it is unlikely that the court would have 
viewed her decision to move as being justified by exceptional 
circumstances.  In fact, when Mrs. Croll brought Christina to 
the United States, she claimed that she only intended to remain 
for a few weeks.111  Therefore, her decision to make a short visit 
to the United States would not likely lead one to the conclusion 
that there was a pressing concern or exceptional circumstance 
requiring the move—even if one were to believe her testimony 
that she thought about remaining permanently.112  After all, if 
the move was motivated by some pressing concern, Mrs. Croll 
likely would have known when she left Hong Kong that she was 
leaving for good.  Either way, it was clear that if she intended to 
move, the Hong Kong court required her to get consent from 
either Mr. Croll or from the court itself.113        
In the United States, when the court attempts to determine 
the best interests of the child and whether to let a divorced par-
ent relocate with his or her child, no single factor or circum-
stance is controlling.114  On the contrary, the court must balance 
many factors in deciding the best interests of the child.115  The 
  
 109. Pecorello, 142 A.D. 2d at 921 (Pine and Balio, JJ., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
 110. Id. at 921. 
 111. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 112. Id. at 135.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Pecorello, 142 A.D.2d at 922. 
 115. Id. While the court in Pecorello found there to be exceptional circum-
stances, there does seem to be a trend in American family law towards allow-
ing parents to relocate and modify their visitation arrangements with less 
than exceptional circumstances.  Enrico A. Mazzoli, Note, The Court’s Role 
Facilitating an Effective Relationship Between Noncustodia Parent and Child 
When the Custodial Parent Relocates with Child, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 259, 262 
(1999).  Courts are increasingly prone to changing the standard for allowing a 
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Hague Convention, however, does not specifically provide for an 
  
move from the exceptional circumstances standard to the best-interests-of-
the-child standard.  Id.  Additionally, more courts are finding that it is in the 
best interests of the child to move. Id.  While the courts have moved towards 
allowing custodial parents to move for good reasons, this is not to say that is a 
forgone conclusion.  In McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1987), the 
court denied a mother’s motion to move closer to her parents and sisters with 
her child away from the noncustodial parent even though she had been offered 
a job in her new town.  McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508, 510 (N.D. 1987).  
Taking into account the fact that the job did not pay significantly more than 
her current job, the court found that the mother had failed to prove the move 
was in the best interests of the child.  Id. at 508, 510–11.  Clearly, these cases 
show that there is a high burden to prove a move to be in the best interests of 
the child.  As the dissent in McRae points out, however, visitation orders can 
be modified.  Id. at 513. Therefore, the recent trend seems to be to allow the 
move but to modify the visitation arrangement to protect.  See Edwin J. (Ted) 
Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward, or Moving Backward, 15 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 169 (1998).  Terry points out that: 
Courts that traditionally have taken a very restrictive view of reloca-
tion have recently retreated from their previously entrenched posi-
tions against allowing a primary custodian to move to another loca-
tion with his or her children.  In highly publicized cases from Califor-
nia and New York, the highest courts of both states enunciated new 
standards for determining the outcome of relocation cases.  The fact 
patterns and the court’s holdings are noteworthy because they signal 
some important changes in how relocation cases are being handled 
from coast to coast.    
Id.  Terry also points out that much of the difficulty that the courts have in 
deciding whether to let custodial parents relocate with their children is that 
there are two different theories proposed by social and forensic scientists 
about how to protect children of divorce from emotional scarring.  Id. at 167–
68.  Terry notes that:   
One holds that children need both of their parents and prosper so-
cially and emotionally when both parents remain actively involved in 
their lives…The second proposition is that while children need con-
tact with both parents, the quality of the relationship between the 
noncustodial parent and the child may be far more important than 
daily contact between them, and further, that the child’s well-being is 
affected more by the stability of the new family unit – including the 
happiness and adjustment of the custodial parent.  
Id. at 168.  Regardless of which proposition one believes is more accurate and 
beneficial to the child, certainly these matters should be decided on a case-by 
case-basis.  In any event, “the clear trend today favors standards allowing 
modifications to accommodate relocation by the parent with primary custody, 
so long as the relocation occurs in good faith.”  Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. 
Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 40 (2002).   
File: Dan MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on:  3/30/2005 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:17 PM 
666 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:2 
inquiry into the best interests of the child.116  While the ultimate 
decision regarding custody, visitation, and  the best interests of 
the child should ultimately be left up to the home state, the 
Convention should allow the requested state to perform a best 
interests test in considering whether a child to be returned to 
his or her home state.117  However, since the court has no au-
thority to consider the best interests of the child in cases where 
parents have rights of access, the court in Croll must refuse 
jurisdiction.   
By refusing to return Christina to Hong Kong for a determi-
nation as to whether it would be in her best interests to move 
away from her father to the United States, there was no inquiry 
into what was in her best interests.118  As a result, by allowing a 
parent with rights of custody to move without the consent of the 
parent with rights of access or the permission of the courts, the 
child’s best interests may be endangered without an inquiry 
into whether there was a sufficient reason to relocate and 
thereby disrupt the noncustodial parent’s regular rights of ac-
cess.  In Croll, the court does not attempt to see whether there 
  
 116. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 431.  “While the Convention does not 
specifically address the interests of the child, it “upholds unequivocally the 
idea that access rights are the natural counterpart of custody rights, a coun-
terpart which must in principle be acknowledged as belonging to the parent 
who does not have custody of the child.”  Id. at 432.  Clearly, if the Convention 
viewed access rights to be such an important counterpart, then it must be 
amended in such a way that it can actually protect such rights.          
 117. This best interests test would not be to decide who should be awarded 
custody ultimately. Pérez-Vera, in her commentary to the Convention points 
out some of the problems with having the abducted-to countries performing 
best interests test and making custody determinations: 
[W]e cannot ignor[e] the fact that recourse by internal authorities to 
such a notion involves the risk of their expressing particular cultural, 
social, etc. attitudes which themselves derive from a given nationally 
community and thus basically imposing their own subjective value 
judgments upon the national community from which the child has re-
cently been snatched. 
Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 431.   
 118. Actually, it is likely that the best interests of the child were determined 
in Hong Kong, for it is unlikely the Hong Kong matrimonial court would have 
included a ne exeat clause if they thought it was contrary to the child’s best 
interests.  Therefore, the problem is not that there was no best interests test, 
but, rather, that a parent is allowed to act contrary to a best interests deter-
mination.   
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was any proof of educational, health or economic need to relo-
cate.  Therefore, the Convention leaves all of the power in de-
termining the best interests to Mrs. Croll simply by removing 
Christina from the home State.119        
Whereas the Convention gives sole power to the custodial 
parent to decide where a child can live by failing to fashion a 
return remedy for violation of a parent’s rights of access, in 
many parts of the United States, noncustodial parents have a 
statutory right to reasonable visitation as well as decision-
making power with regard to the residence of their child.120  In 
fact, some courts refer to a noncustodial parent’s right to visita-
tion as a natural right.121  Courts and legislatures recognize that 
reasonable visitation (unless proven otherwise) is in the best 
interests of the child.122  While the right of visitation is not 
unlimited, visitation requirements must be in the best interests 
of the child.123  Therefore, if a court is to grant stringent visita-
  
 119. Ironically, it is courts’ inability under the Convention to consider a 
child’s best interests which has been credited with making the Convention a 
success.  Marguerite C. Walter, Note, Toward the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Decisions Concerning Transnational Parent-Child Contact, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV 2381, 2386 (2004) (“It is the Abduction Convention’s simplicity, along 
with its purposeful avoidance of the difficult underlying issue of the best in-
terests of the child, that is largely responsible for its success in attracting a 
large number of States Parties and in achieving a high level of returns of ab-
ducted children.”). 
 120. Adamson v. Chavis, 672 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting Section 61.13(2)(b)(1)., Florida Statutes (1994).   Here, the statute 
provides that: 
It is public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents 
separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage 
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing.  After 
considering all relevant facts, the father of a child shall be given the 
same consideration as the mother in determining the primary resi-
dence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child. 
Id.   
 121. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. 1983).  In Maxwell, the 
parent seeking visitation rights was an out-of-wedlock parent, but the court 
still found that parents are entitled to visitation even if they are not the le-
gitimate parents of a child.  Id. at 377. 
 122. Id. at 379.   
 123. Id. at 377. “The presumption in favor of visitation can only be overcome 
by conclusive evidence that the parent has forfeited his right of access by his 
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tion requirements, they too must be in the best interests of the 
child.124   
As a result of the great distance between New York and Hong 
Kong, reasonable visitation is unlikely to be feasible.125  Mrs. 
Croll’s actions, therefore, have created a situation similar to 
those where stringent visitation is granted.  However, since 
there is no evidence that stringent visitation is in Christina’s 
best interests, this situation is not only unfair to Mr. Croll, but 
it may very well be detrimental to Christina.126  In addition, this 
power gives Mrs. Croll the discretion to decide how, when, and 
if visitation occurs.  Public policy should not award such deci-
sion-making power to the custodial parent.  This type of power 
would seem to encourage visitational vigilantism rather than 
enforce the belief that custodial parents must have a respect for 
the law of their home State.  In order to prevent this from oc-
curring, there should be an amendment to the Convention 
which would allow the possibility of a return remedy for parents 
who have rights of access coupled with ne exeat clauses so that 
the court in the child’s habitual residence can make sure that 
relocation is in the best interests of the child.     
  
conduct or that exercise of the right would injuriously affect the child’s wel-
fare.”  Id. at 379. 
 124. Id. at 378. 
 125. See generally Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).  In Vi-
ragh, the court found itself unable to fashion a remedy for the noncustodial 
parent due to the fact that he was indigent and unable to pay for trips to visit 
his child.  Horstmeyer, supra note 87, at 138 (discussing Viragh v. Foldes, 612 
N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).  While it is not necessarily the case that Mr. Croll is 
indigent, it is clear that continued visitation between the United States and 
Hong Kong would prove to be quite costly and could utterly frustrate his right 
of access.  Croll, 229 F.3d at 142.    
 126. Maxwell, 434 So. 2d at 379.   
Visitation is important for a child’s whole growth, mental, physical 
and spiritual and a denial of visitation can make a child feel rejected 
and confused.  The child’s experience of family continuity and connec-
tion is a basic and fundamental ingredient of his sense of self, of his 
sense of personal significance and his sense of identity.  While a child 
is cut off from one of his parents…there is, for the child and the par-
ent…a mutual sense of deep personal loss.  
Id. 
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C. Modification of Visitation Agreements  
Some states seek to ensure that the trial court visitation 
agreements are fair by providing trial courts with the statutory 
right to modify visitation rights if such a modification would be 
in the best interests of the child.127  One recognized basis for 
such modification is when there has been a change of circum-
stances.128  For example, in Missouri, if a custodial parent moves 
a considerable distance from a noncustodial parent, it can be 
deemed a change of circumstances, and the court may adjust 
visitation to meet the best interests of the child.129  In Dover v. 
Dover, when a custodial parent moved more than two hundred 
miles away from the noncustodial parent, the court recognized 
that such a long distance impeded the noncustodial parent’s 
visitation because it could diminish the quality of visitation and 
lead to resentment on the part of the child, the parent, or 
both.130  As a result, the court modified the visitation schedule in 
order to make sure that it created the best opportunity for 
meaningful contact with that parent.131  This decision was due 
to Missouri’s presumption that “frequent and meaningful com-
munication with both parents is in the child's best interest.”132     
Another way of illustrating how courts value visitation rights 
is to examine how difficult it is to lose such rights.  In West Vir-
ginia, for example, visitation may be suspended only under the 
most severe circumstances, such as in cases of sexual abuse or 
aggravated domestic violence.133  However, even in cases where 
visitation was interrupted due to sexual abuse and aggravated 
domestic violence, the courts have attempted to maintain the 
bond between noncustodial parents and their children.134  In 
Hawk v. Hawk, the court did this by restoring supervised visita-
tion as soon as it was no longer deemed detrimental to the 
child’s well-being and if the noncustodial parent agreed to fam-
  
 127. Dover v. Dover, 930 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.    
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 496. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Dover, 930 S.W.2d at 496. See Hawk v. Hawk 506 S.E.2d 85, 88 (W. Va. 
1998) (“Total suspension of visitation is justified only under the most severe 
circumstances.”).      
 134. Id. 
File: Dan MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on:  3/30/2005 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:17 PM 
670 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:2 
ily therapy counseling.135  In fact, even in cases where the par-
ent has had his or her parental rights terminated due to neglect 
or abuse, the court recognizes the importance of a strong bond 
between a parent and a child and may continue to allow visita-
tion.136     
In the Croll decision, there is no discussion of abuse or ne-
glect,137 and it is clear that Mr. Croll had been exercising his 
rights of access.138  However, as we can see from domestic policy, 
even if there had been abuse or neglect, there could still have 
been reason to believe that it was in Christina’s best interests 
to maintain ties with her father.139  Due to the courts’ predilec-
tion towards allowing the noncustodial parent to maintain con-
stant contact with the child, it is not surprising that courts are 
also reticent to permit the removal of a child from the jurisdic-
tion without the noncustodial parent’s consent.140  Some courts 
have found that before a court will permit the removal of a mi-
nor child from the jurisdiction, “the custodial parent must sat-
isfy the court that there is a legitimate reason for leaving the 
state and that it is in the minor child's best interests to con-
  
 135. Id. 
 136. In re Katie S. v. David S., 479 S.E.2d 589, 601 (W. Va. 1996).  The court 
noted that: 
Circuit courts should be aware that post-termination visitation, ei-
ther with siblings or parents, may be in the best interest of the child, 
especially when there is a close bond and the child maintains love 
and affection for either her siblings or parents. Where no bond exists, 
the consideration of post-termination visitation is not required. When 
parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit 
court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether con-
tinued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the 
best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuit court shall 
consider whether a close emotional bond has been established be-
tween parent and child and the child's wishes, if he or she is of ap-
propriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate 
that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to 
the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest.  
Id.  
 137. See Weiner, supra note 34.  
 138. Croll, 229 F.3d  at 135. 
 139. In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d at 601. 
 140. Id. 
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tinue to live with that parent.”141  It is unlikely that the Croll 
case would have met this standard since the mother testified 
that she did not even know that she was going to stay in the 
United States.142 
D.  Federal Statutes Aimed At Parental Abductions 
While the rules regarding international child abduction are 
quite complex and require the cooperation of courts from differ-
ent countries to interpret the Hague Convention, parental child 
abduction has also been a challenge for the courts within the 
United States.  Therefore, Congress enacted a number of stat-
utes in order to deter the abduction or unilateral removal of 
children by parents in order to obtain custody awards.143  The 
  
 141. See Parisien v. Parisien, No. A-98-894, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS 191, at 
*35 (Neb. Ct. App. July 6, 1999).  See McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508, 509 
(N.D. 1987).  The Mcrae court noted: 
Where the noncustodial parent has been given and has exercised visi-
tation rights, the custodial parent has the burden of securing an or-
der for a change of residence of the child to another state by demon-
strating that it is in the best interests of the child to do so. There is a 
legally recognizable right of visitation between a child and the non-
custodial parent, which is considered to be in the best interests of the 
child. The statutory recognition of visitation rights between a child 
and the noncustodial parent is consistent with placing the burden 
upon the custodial parent to show that moving the child to another 
state is in the child's best interest. There is no presumption that a 
custodial parent's decision to change a child's residence to another 
state is in a child's best interests. 
McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509. 
 142. Mrs. Croll’s testimony that she did not plan on staying in the United 
States is questionable because she did admit that “‘in the back of her mind’ 
she intended to remain in the United States permanently.”  Croll, 229 F.3d at 
135.  However, since the court accepts her testimony, for the purposes of this 
Note, her testimony should be accepted as true.  
 143. Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A.2d 202, 204 (Me. 1983) (citing Congres-
sional Findings and Declarations of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–611, § 7(c)(6)) [hereinafter PKPA].  From 
Peterson, it is clear that one of the goals of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act and the PKPA was to avoid a race to the courthouse effect.  Id.  By 
instituting a home state requirement, the statutes take away the incentive for 
a parent to take a child to a foreign jurisdiction in order to get a custody de-
cree.  Id.  Therefore, in Peterson, even though the father filed first in Maine, 
the state did not actually have jurisdiction over the case, so it could not bar 
the mother from filing for custody in the child’s home state.  Id. 
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which was 
later modified by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction En-
forcement Act (UCCJEA) and the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA) have some of the same stated goals as the 
Hague Convention, but they attempt to meet those goals in dif-
ferent ways.144   
1. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
Under the UCCJA, the state that makes an initial custody 
decree (assuming it had jurisdiction to do so) maintains con-
tinuing jurisdiction as long as one of the parties remains in that 
state.145 The Supreme Court of Washington in Greenlaw v. 
Smith146 effectively protects and preserves the jurisdiction of its 
trial court even in situations where a child has established a 
  
 144. In Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96–611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3568, Congress found 
that:  
[I]t is necessary to establish a national system for locating parents 
and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another and are 
concealed in connection with such disputes, and to establish national 
standards under which the courts of such jurisdictions will determine 
their jurisdiction to decide such disputes and the effect to be given by 
each such jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other juris-
dictions.  
Id.  Congress indicated the general objectives of the PKPA were to:  
[P]romote cooperation between State courts to the end that a deter-
mination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can 
best decide the case in the interest of the child; promote and expand 
the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance be-
tween States which are concerned with the same child; facilitate the 
enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister states; dis-
courage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the 
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family 
relationships for the child; avoid jurisdictional competition and con-
flict between State courts in matters of child custody and visitation 
which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from State 
to State with harmful effects on their well being; and deter interstate 
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to 
obtain custody and visitation awards.   
Id.   
 145. Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994).  
 146. Id. 
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new “home state”147 under the UCCJA.  Therefore, even if the 
child has moved to a new home state, the old state has jurisdic-
tion over the case, and it may modify the decree as it sees fit.148  
Greenlaw holds that as long as one of the parents remains and 
the child maintains sufficient contact with the state, no parent 
can simply escape its jurisdiction by moving to another state.149  
As the court in Greenlaw notes, “interpreting the UCCJA to al-
low an automatic shift in modification jurisdiction simply be-
cause a child establishes a new home state would not further 
the purposes of the Act as it would permit forum shopping and 
instability of custody decrees.”150  This interpretation makes 
sense because it eliminates instability and also prevents par-
ents from benefiting from their bad actions.151  After all, if one 
were to remove one’s child without consent and in violation of 
the court order, it would be unfair for the place where the par-
ent moves to get home state jurisdiction.152  The court does not 
  
 147. Under the UCCJA, a state is considered to be the “home state” if it is 
where the child lived for at least six consecutive months with his or her par-
ents.  Id. at n.4 
 148. Id. at 1024. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1033.  Thus, the court interprets the UCCJA and PKPA:  
[T]o mean that jurisdiction to modify a custody decree continues with 
the decree state so long as: 1) that state’s decree is entered in compli-
ance with the UCCJA and PKPA; 2) one of the parents or other con-
testants continues to reside in the decree state; and 3) the child con-
tinues to have more than slight contact with the decree state.  The 
child’s continued visitation with the parent who remains in the de-
cree state may constitute more than slight contact within the decree 
state. 
Id.   
 151. Greenlaw, 869 P.2d at 1033. 
 152. This is not to say that the home state jurisdiction will never change.  It 
would still behoove the parent in the left-behind state to file for custody 
quickly in the home state and to maintain contact with the child so that the 
court will not voluntarily give up its jurisdiction to the new state.  This is 
because “even though a decree state has jurisdiction to modify its own decree, 
that state is not required to retain jurisdiction if another state appears to be a 
more appropriate, more convenient forum.”  Id.  Since Mr. Croll filed in a 
short period of time, there is no reason to think that the Hong Kong Court 
would choose not to exercise its jurisdiction.  Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.  While he 
may not have continued to visit with his child, this is more due to the fact that 
visitation became impracticable, and it would be unfair to penalize him by 
saying that Christina no longer had slight contact with Hong Kong.   
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distinguish between reasonable visitation rights and custody 
rights but, rather, seeks to enforce them both equally because 
they are both legitimate concerns and should be considered 
equally important.   
2. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
The PKPA was also designed to eliminate some of the same 
problems caused by interstate child kidnapping, such as forum-
shopping and conflicting state decrees.153  Congress also had 
policy reasons for wanting to penalize parents for attempting to 
evade custody decrees by taking children out of their home 
state.154  While the PKPA was not created to grant or deny ini-
tial jurisdiction, it was created to ensure that the issuing state 
court would be granted full faith and credit to the custody de-
crees of other states.155  When it comes to jurisdiction, prefer-
ence is initially granted to the child’s home state under the 
PKPA.156  However, if no state has home state jurisdiction, an-
other state may take jurisdiction as long as it has a significant 
connection to the child and either of the parties.157  The reason-
ing behind allowing states to take emergency jurisdiction over 
cases is to ensure that there will be a forum in order to protect 
the best interests of the child.158                         
E. Domestic Remedies for Enforcing Visitation Agreements  
In cases where a parent attempts to circumvent a court’s de-
cision, as the mother did in Croll, courts in the United States 
take the responsibility of enforcing visitation agreements seri-
ously.  As the New Jersey state court noted:    
It is well settled that the law favors visitation and protects 
against the thwarting of visitation rights….The courts should 
endeavor that children of separated parents should be imbued 
  
 153. For a comprehensive review of the circumstances leading up to the 
enactment of the PKPA, see Ann T. Wilson, The Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act: Is There An Enforcement Role For The Federal Courts?, 62 WASH L. 
REV. 841 (1987). 
 154. 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 960 (2003).    
 155. Id.    
 156. Greenlaw, 869 P. 2d at 1024. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.   
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with love and respect for both parents, and where children are 
in custody of one parent, the court should endeavor to effect 
this facet of the children's welfare by conferring reasonable 
rights of visitation of the other parent. Accordingly, when one 
parent willfully violates the visitation of the other parent, the 
court must act swiftly and affirmatively.159 
One of the most drastic ways that the court may act to ensure 
that its decisions are followed is to order a change of custody.160  
In Clark v. Bullard, Mrs. Bullard had been awarded permanent 
custody of their child and moved to Florida without Mr. Clark’s 
consent or knowledge.161  When this occurred, Mr. Clark made a 
motion for a change of custody which was denied.162  However, 
on appeal, the State Supreme Court added that if Mrs. Bullard 
continued to thwart Mr. Clark’s visitation, the trial court could 
reconsider the motion to change custody.163  While Mrs. Bullard 
remained in Florida, she continued to evade Mr. Clark, and he 
could not locate his child for six months, whereupon he again 
moved for a change of custody.164  Mr. Clark served Mrs. Bul-
lard’s attorney, but the attorney was unable to contact Mrs. 
Bullard about the hearing.165  After a hearing, the court ordered 
a change of custody, and Mr. Clark was given custody of his 
child.166  Then Mrs. Bullard returned to Minnesota and moved 
for relief based on the fact that she had not been notified of the 
hearing, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
case for a full evidentiary hearing.167   
After the trial, the court found that Mrs. Bullard had done 
everything possible to frustrate Mr. Clark’s visitation privi-
leges.168  As a result, Mrs. Bullard had violated a Minnesota 
statute which said that “proof of an unwarranted denial of or 
  
 159. Paterno v. Paterno,  603 A.2d 137, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) 
(court maintained jurisdiction over all equitable remedies and powers of relief 
available to the court, but the defendant could also be found  liable in criminal 
court).    
 160. Clark v. Bullard, 396 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Clark, 396 N.W.2d at 43. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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interference with duly established visitation may constitute 
contempt of court and may be sufficient cause for reversal of 
custody.”169  Consequently, the court awarded Mr. Clark cus-
tody.170  The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the modifi-
cation of custody based on the findings that the trial court had 
not abused its discretion by transferring custody to Mr. Clark.171     
While there have been cases where custody has been trans-
ferred due to the frustration of visitation, this is not the most 
common remedy for a number of reasons.172  Some courts do not 
elect to award custody to someone as a punishment to the cus-
todial parent because the noncustodial parent is not necessarily 
a better caretaker of the child.173  Consequently, it will not al-
ways be in the best interests of the child to switch custody in 
order to punish the custodial parent from evading the visitation 
order.174  Nevertheless, it is well within the court’s power to 
  
 169. Id. at 44 (citations omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 45. 
 172. Laloggia-Vonhegel v. Vonhegel, 732 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999).  This case is a good example of a court deciding against a change 
of custody merely based on a parent’s interference with visitation.  In this 
case, the mother moved to from Florida to New York without providing notice 
to her ex-husband, and the trial court wanted to sanction her by making a 
temporary change of physical custody.  Id.  The decision, however, was re-
versed because the appellate court did not believe a change of custody to be 
the appropriate sanction.  Id.  The court found that: 
[T]he general purpose of a civil contempt order is to obtain compli-
ance with the trial court’s initial order.  The sanction of changing cus-
tody does not coerce compliance; rather, it may, in the absence of a 
finding that such a change is in the best interest of the children, pe-
nalize the children for the parent’s contumacious conduct.  In com-
parison, an award of make-up or additional visitation may serve both 
to redress the wrong to the parent and to effectuate compliance with 
the court’s authority.   
Id.  As a result, the court reversed the change of custody because there was 
“insufficient evidence to ground a finding that it would be in the children’s 
best interest to be placed in Mr. Von Hegel’s custody, even temporarily.”  Id. 
 173. Id. (“The custodial parent’s relocating the children to another state is 
insufficient by itself to warrant a change in custody.”).  In reversing the 
change of custody, the court demonstrated that there is an “extraordinary 
burden of proving a substantial and material change of circumstances such 
that it would be detrimental to the children to remain in the custody of [the 
custodial parent.]”  Id. 
 174. In J.B. v. A.B., the court held that “the award of custody ‘should not be 
an exercise in punishment of an offending spouse.  In punishing the offending 
 
File: Dan MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on: 3/30/2005 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:17 PM 
2005] INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 677 
award temporary legal and physical custody to the noncustodial 
parent when there are repeated violations of visitation orders.175    
Due to the potential pitfalls related to ordering a change in 
custody, courts are more inclined to hold parents in civil con-
tempt for violating custody decrees in order to coerce them into 
complying with visitation rights.176  In fact, parents can be held 
in civil or criminal contempt and sentenced to jail time even 
when they attempt to comply with the court order and do not 
intentionally disregard a court order.177  Furthermore, one does 
  
spouse one may also punish the innocent child, and our law will not tolerate 
that result.’” J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 256 (W. Va. 1978) (citations omit-
ted).  For a case in which a trial court’s modification of a change in custody is 
reversed, see Arnold v. Gouvitsa, 735 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).  In 
this case, the appeals court voided a trial court’s order to change custody 
based on a mother’s refusal to abide by its prior orders.  Id. at 463.  The deci-
sion, however, was voided in this case because of a jurisdictional matter.  Id. 
at 463–64.  Under the UCCJA, the court found that the trial court erred by 
making a custody determination under the guise of a contempt proceeding.  
Id. at 463.  Since the custodial parent was not given notice regarding a cus-
tody proceeding, the court found that notice was defective, and the case was 
reversed.  Id. 
 175. See Shonkwiler v. Kriska, 780 So. 2d 703, 704 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).  In 
this case, the father was granted temporary custody because the mother had 
deliberately moved twenty times in a four-year period in order to deny him 
visitation rights.  Id. at 704.  In addition, the mother had left the state with 
the children for a full year.  Id.  Consequently, the court found that it would 
be in the child’s best interests to temporarily switch custody over to the fa-
ther.  Id.  In addition, the mother was sentenced to 30 days in prison.  Id. at 
705. 
 176. See generally Ex Parte: Rebecca Ann Hudson, 429 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1983) (affirming contempt order for indefinite period of time).  
 177. See Kurincic v. Kurincic, No. 76505, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3957, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2000) for an example of a parent being held in civil 
contempt.  See also Whitman v. Whitman, 2000 Ohio 1935, 1935 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2000) for a case of criminal contempt.  It is not easy to draw a line be-
tween civil contempt and criminal contempt, but the test for determining 
whether to impose a sentence of civil or criminal contempt was established in 
United States v. Shillitani.  US v. Shillitani, 384 U.S. 364, 364 (1966).  The 
test that the Whitman court used asks the appellate court to discern what the 
trial court primarily sought to accomplish by imposing sentence.   
While both types of contempt contain an element of punishment, 
courts distinguish criminal and civil contempt not on the basis of 
punishment, but rather, by character and purpose of the punish-
ment.…The purpose of a civil contempt citation is to coerce, whereas 
the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish. 
 
File: Dan MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on:  3/30/2005 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:17 PM 
678 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:2 
not even have to prevent visitation to be held in contempt; in-
stead, it is enough to engage in behavior that undermines or 
alienates a child’s relationship with his or her noncustodial 
parent.178   In these instances, punishment is considered proper 
and justified because one cannot use the defense to a charge of 
civil contempt that one unintentionally disregarded the court 
order.179  Generally, when one is placed in civil contempt, it is 
within the parent’s power to get freed from jail by purging his 
or her contempt by complying with the order.    
Judges are not limited to the remedy of incarceration, but, 
rather, are authorized to provide other remedial relief such as 
fines in order to coerce the plaintiff’s compliance with the visi-
tation schedule.180  In Olexovitch v. Carralero, for example, when 
the court found that a mother had been alienating her child 
from her father, the court ordered her to take the child to ther-
apy sessions in order to heal the relationship that she had at-
tempted to wound.181 
V. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RIGHTS 
OF ACCESS 
A. Thomson v. Thomson 
While the Convention does not authorize a return remedy for 
parents with rights of access, it still leaves it up to the courts to 
decide whether a person had rights of access or rights of cus-
tody.  In Thomson v. Thomson, both parents were seeking cus-
tody of their seven month old child in Scotland.182  The Scottish 
  
Id. (citations omitted). In general, domestic relations cases are more likely to 
impose civil contempt than criminal contempt.  A.G. v. R.M.D. 19896 Mo. App. 
LEXIS 4630, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1986).   
 178. See Olexovitch v. Carralero, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 580 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Feb. 23, 2001). 
 179. See Pugh v. Pugh, 472 N.E.2d 1089 (Ohio. 1984).  “[N]o inquiry into 
intent to disobey is required to determine whether a civil contempt has been 
committed.” A.G. v. R.M.D, 1986 Mo. App. LEXIS, at *8–9.  Since intent is 
irrelevant, good faith is also not considered a valid defense to civil contempt.  
Id. at *9.  Instead, one just has to knowingly violate a court mandate.  Id. at 
*10.  However, judges may take intent into consideration when they are creat-
ing a punishment for civil contempt.  Id.     
 180. Olexovitch, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 580.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589 (Can.). 
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Court granted interim custody to the child’s mother and interim 
access to the father.183  Additionally, the court ordered that the 
child remain in Scotland pending a final order.184  Nevertheless, 
Mrs. Thomson took the child to Canada and eventually decided 
to stay in violation of the court order.185  If the Canadian court 
followed Croll’s rationale that the father only had rights of ac-
cess, it would have had to refuse jurisdiction to order a return 
remedy.  However, the court in Thomson did not refuse jurisdic-
tion.186  Instead, the court found that “while the Convention does 
not provide specifically for remedial flexibility, a court must be 
assumed to have sufficient control over its process to take the 
necessary action to meet the purpose and spirit of the Conven-
tion.”187  The court found that ordering the return of the child 
would meet the purpose and the spirit of the Convention.188   
B. David v. Zamira 
In 1991, a New York family court had to decide whether to re-
turn two children to Canada.189  The facts in this case were simi-
lar to Croll in that the mother had custody of their son, and the 
father was granted regular visitation according to their separa-
tion agreement.190  At some point after Zamira gave birth to 
their second child, David applied for an order to prevent Zamira 
from removing the children from Ontario and from getting 
passports for them.191  The Supreme Court of Ontario granted 
the request.192  Nevertheless, Zamira left Ontario and David 
filed an application pursuant to the Hague Convention.193  The 
  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589 (Can.). 
 189. David v. Zamira, 151 Misc. 2d 630. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991). 
 190. Id. at 632. 
 191. Id.  While Zamira had been granted custody of the older child when the 
couple separated, she was never granted custody of the younger child because 
she was born after the separation agreement.  Id.  Therefore, while one could 
argue that Zamira was only violating David’s rights of access with regard to 
their older son, there is no question that she was violating his rights of cus-
tody with regard to their younger daughter.  Id. at 635. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General forwarded the appli-
cation to the U.S. Department of State, and the Department of 
State communicated with the New York State Clearinghouse 
for Missing and Exploited Children.194  Eventually, the children 
were located in Brooklyn, New York.195   
When David located the children in New York, he returned to 
the Supreme Court of Canada and was granted temporary cus-
tody of both children.196  One month later, the Supreme Court of 
Ontario made a finding that Zamira had wrongfully and im-
properly removed the children from Ontario.197  The following 
month, the Supreme Court of Ontario issued a similar order 
stating that Zamira was withholding her children from David 
even though he was entitled to custody and access.198  Then, 
David filed a motion for enforcement of the Supreme Court of 
Ontario’s order.199   
In David v. Zamira, as in Croll, there was a ne exeat clause as 
a result of the separation agreement.200  This case differs from 
Croll in that it is governed by Canadian law, which ordinarily 
presumes that both parents are equally entitled to custody of a 
child.201  While David had given up his right with regard to his 
  
 194. Id. 
 195. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 635. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 632–33. 
 198. Id. at 633. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 634. The New York Supreme Court took judicial 
notice of the fact that in Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act, which provides 
that “father and mother of a child are equally entitled to the custody of the 
child.”  Id.  It is worth noting that Ontario’s recognition that parents are 
equally entitled to custody of the child is not universally revered.  For exam-
ple, the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) submitted a 
brief to the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access in March of 
1998.  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, CUSTODY AND 
ACCESS: AN NAWL BRIEF TO THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON CHILD 
CUSTODY AND ACCESS (1998), available at http://www.harbour.sfu.ca/freda/ 
reports/custody.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).  NAWL is a “national, non-
profit, feminist organization active in legal research, law reform, and public 
education.”  Id.  As part of its brief, NAWL believed there was a “growing and 
disturbing trend by Canadian courts to eliminate the distinction between sole 
custody with access and joint custody, by giving access parents almost the 
same rights as custodial parents.”  Id.  NAWL also lists a great number of 
assumptions that it believes are inaccurate.  Id.  For example, NAWL believes 
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son in the separation agreement, which was executed prior to 
the birth of his daughter, David was still entitled to equal cus-
tody of his daughter.202  Additionally, according to the separa-
tion agreement, Zamira was not permitted to leave Toronto, 
much less Canada.203   
However, in contrast to Croll, the court was willing to ensure 
that the Canadian ruling would be allowed to take effect.204  In 
fact, the court disregarded the access rights versus custody 
rights debate by finding that Zamira’s “contemptuous conduct, 
and the subsequent orders of the Supreme Court of Ontario 
which give temporary custody of both children to the petitioner” 
made her argument lose its merit.205  Therefore, unlike in Croll, 
the court found that there was a wrongful removal within the 
meaning of the Hague Convention.206  Since the court also did 
not find any of the exceptions to the Hague Convention to be 
applicable, they ordered the return of the children.207                         
Croll and David, may seem inconsistent.  However, there is 
no question that the court in David came to the correct decision, 
for it actually did what the Hague Convention should have set 
out to accomplish, which is to ensure that the country of habit-
ual residence is able to determine custody disputes, under the 
presumption that the habitual residence is best equipped to 
handle such cases.208  This case can, however, be reconciled with 
Croll because of the differences between Canadian and U.S. 
law.  Since Ontario presumes that both parents have rights of 
custody,209 the court did not find that they had to refuse jurisdic-
  
that maximum contact with both parents is not necessarily in the best inter-
ests of all children, frequent access is not necessarily more beneficial, and 
proximity is not necessarily an accurate way to predict regular contact.  Id.  
Additionally, NAWL also “strongly opposes any presumption of joint custody, 
in any legislation whether it be federal, provincial or territorial.  There is no 
evidence to support that a presumption of joint custody is in the best interests 
of the child and the needs of the child.”  Id.   
 202. David, 151 Misc. 2d  at 634–35. 
 203. Id. at 635. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  Once David was granted temporary custody of both children, 
Zamira could not longer successfully argue that she was only violating his 
rights of access as opposed to rights of custody.  Id.   
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 637.  
 208. See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 446–47. 
 209. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C.12, § 20(1) (1990) (Can.).   
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tion even though when interpreting an international treaty, 
treaty definitions should take precedence over State law.210  In-
stead, the court found a wrongful removal and ordered that the 
child be returned under the terms of the Convention.211   
Since there is no such presumption in Hong Kong, however, 
the Croll court could not proceed once it determined that Mr. 
Croll did not have rights of custody.212  However, even if Hong 
Kong did have such a presumption, it is the requested State’s 
decision whether there are rights of access or rights of cus-
tody.213  Therefore, due to some courts’ aversion and inability to 
interpret foreign law, results in similar cases can be quite dif-
ferent.  These two separate outcomes in factually similar situa-
tions point out that the Convention fails to precisely define the 
scope of protected rights.  In David, the court was forced to in-
terpret Canadian law in order to determine whether the parent 
had and was exercising rights of custody.214  Similarly, in Croll, 
the court had to interpret Hong Kong law to determine whether 
the parent had and was exercising rights of custody.215   
The problem is that the Hague Convention was not designed 
for courts to interpret the family law of foreign countries; this 
procedure is fraught with problems and is bound to lead to mis-
interpretation and inconsistent adjudications.216  Instead, the 
  
 210. In other words, since the court found that David had rights of custody, 
they avoided the Convention’s definition of rights of access.    
 211. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 637. 
 212. Croll, 229 F.3d at 143–44. 
 213. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 452 (“As for knowing when joint custody 
exists, that is a question which must be decided in each particular case, and in 
light of the law of the child’s habitual residence.”). 
 214. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 634. 
 215. Croll, F.3d at 135. 
 216. This difficulty is clearly evidenced in Friedrich v. Friedrich.  Friedrich 
v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) where an American service-
woman was living abroad with her husband and child.  Following an argu-
ment, Mrs. Friedrich brought the child to the United States, and Mr. Frie-
drich filed a petition under the Hague Convention.  Id.  In the first case, the 
petition was denied, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case 
because the trial court had failed to determine whether Mr. Friedrich had 
rights of custody under German law.  Id.  On remand, the district court found 
that there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Friedrich had rights of 
custody because under German law, both parents retain rights of custody 
unless the court issued a decree limiting the rights of one of the parents.  Id.  
The court refused to decide whether Mr. Friedrich had actually exercised 
those custody rights because it felt that foreign courts should refrain from 
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Hague Convention should simply ensure that the custody de-
terminations in a child’s habitual residence are respected, for 
there is a strong presumption that the courts in the child’s ha-
bitual residence are in the best position to protect the best in-
terests of child.217  Since there is no reason that a court in a 
child’s habitual residence is any less capable of protecting a 
child’s best interests in cases where a parent has rights of ac-
cess, there is no reason that these court determinations should 
not be upheld and reinforced.  The best way to ensure that 
these decisions are respected is by issuing a return remedy, 
which should be extended to situations in which a parent’s 
rights of access have been unilaterally violated.          
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction has not settled with any certainty how States 
should handle cases where rights of access are violated.218  
While the Croll court tried to interpret the Convention as liter-
ally as possible, the court in Thomson made a decision based on 
what it thought were the interests of justice as well as the pur-
pose and spirit of the Convention.  Therefore, while Croll fol-
lowed what it was mandated to do by the Convention, the result 
of that act is questionable because the solution did not reflect 
the purpose and spirit of the Convention.  As a result, it is nec-
essary for an amendment to the Hague Convention to harmo-
nize the purpose and spirit of the Convention with the interests 
of justice.  To do so, the Hague Convention should authorize a 
return remedy for parents with rights of access.  Such an 
amendment would not only benefit the left-behind parent with 
rights of access, but would also benefit the international com-
munity because it would ensure that the custody determina-
  
making policy decisions, but, rather, allow the home state to determine the 
merits of the custody dispute.  Id. at 1065.       
 217. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 434–35.  As Pérez-Vera noted: 
[S]ignatory States [must] be convinced that they belong, despite their 
differences, to the same legal community within which the authori-
ties of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them – 
those of the child’s habitual residence – are in principle best placed to 
decide upon the questions of custody and access.   
Id.    
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tions of the habitual residence would be enforced.  Most impor-
tantly, however, it would benefit the child, because there is no 
reason to believe that the harmful effects of separation from a 
parent are lessened based on whether the child’s parent had 
custody or merely rights of access.  In addition, the return rem-
edy will ensure that the laws of the home state are respected 
and enforced, another important goal of the Convention.  As a 
result of this change, even more abductions would be prevented, 
for there would be even less incentive to forum shop.  Further, 
justice will be served because the best interests of the child will 
be given paramount importance.  While the majority opinion 
claimed that the Convention would be unworkable if a ne exeat 
clause were to lead to a mandatory return,219 this is simply evi-
dence of the Convention’s failure to take into consideration the 
likely harmful effect such a disruption will have on a child’s life. 
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 219. Croll, 229 F.3d at 143.  See Weiner, supra note 34, at n.125.  Here, 
Weiner argues that the court’s reasoning for claiming that the Convention 
would become unworkable if it required return of a parent who left the coun-
try in violation of a ne exeat clause was problematic (“The court’s reasoning 
was tautological.  Only by defining the issue at hand as ‘rights of access’ could 
it reach this result.”). 
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